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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents, Albert Noorda and Sam L. Guss, cannot
agree entire!y with the statement of facts contained in the
brief of appellants and consequently feel compelled to bring
certain matters to the attention of this Honorable Court in the
following statement.
The Valley Sausage Company is a Utah corporation,
manufacturing pork products into various types of sausage
(Tr. 234, 235, 251 & 252). This corporation was not a party
to the instant suits (Tr. 34 & 35). The defendants and respondents, Albert Noorda and Sam L. Guss, along with a son
of Mr. Guss, do business as a partnership under the firm name
of Jordan Meat & Livestock Company (Tr. 34). This partnership, hereinafter referred to as Jordan Meat, is a wholesale
distributor for the meat products manufactured by Valley
Sausage Company (Tr. 23, 24 & 242). The partnership does
no manufacturing (Tr. 243).
Prior to May, 195 5, Jordan Meat was selling processed
pork products to defendant Suhrmann, a retail meat dealer
doing business as South Temple Meat Company (Tr. 87). The
usual practice was for Suhrmann to place his order through a
Mr. Block, one of the salesmen for Jordan Meat but if Block
could not understand Suhrmann because of the German language barrier, then in such instances, Alfred Hoffman was
called to the telephone to act as an interpreter (Tr. 34, 264
& 265). Hoffman was a sausage maker employed by Valley
Sausage Company; there \vas no telephone in the sausage
kitchen where Hoffn1an worked and it was therefore necessary
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for those at the sales office of Jordan Meat to summon him
when needed as an interpreter (Tr. 29, 32, 34, 304 & 305).
In May, 1955, defendant Suhrmann was informed by
Jordan Meat that Valley Sausage Company could not furnish
any more of the product known as mettwurst and a conversation took place at the Valley Sausage plant between defendant
Noorda and Suhrmann wherein Noorda told Suhrmann,
through Albert Hoffman acting as an interpreter, that they
could no longer sell the finished product of mettwurst to
Suhrmann because their ovens could not be cooled down during
the week for the processing of it. Prior to this time, all of the
mettwurst sold to Suhrmann had been fully processed in the
large smoke ovens of Valley Sausage Company and heated
to 13 7 or 140 degrees Fahrenheit to insure the elimination
of any trichina in the pork used in making the product (Tr.
243, 244, 245, 256, 257, 287 & 288). Defendant Suhrmann
also told N oorda that they were smoking the mettwurst too
much and that his customers didn't like it that way (Tr. 245);
also that he had a smoke oven at his place of business and
proposed that he buy the mettwurst in a raw and unprocessed
state and represented that he knew how to process the product
to completion for retail sale to his customers (Tr. 246, 247
& 248). From that time, all mettwurst sold to defendant
Suhrmann by Jordan Meat was in a raw and unprocessed
condition and was further processed by Suhrmann at his own
place of business (Tr. 64, 210, 211, 248, 249, 252, 25 3, 294
& 295). Noorda had no knowledge of what equipment
Suhrmann had at his place of business nor had he or defendant
Guss told Suhrmann about the further processing of the raw
5
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mettwurst which had been sold to Suhrmann after May, 1955
(Tr. 33, 255 & 256).
Defendant Suhrmann testified that Alfred Hoffman had
instructed him in the method of curing raw mettwurst or had
assisted him in so doing. This was emphatically denied by
Hoffman (Tr. 282, 283 & 297).
Noorda contradicted the testimony of defendant Suhrmann and his wife that any mettwurst smoked and processed
by Suhrmann was returned to Jordan Meat for re-sale (Tr.
249 & 250). The same price was charged Suhrmann for the
raw mettwurst as had been charged for the processed product
except that Suhrmann received a credit in poundage amounting
roughly to 5% on account of the shrinkage resulting from
the heat created in processing the raw mettwurst (Tr. 248,
249, 250, 254 & 255).
Inspectors from the Salt Lake City Board of Health were
present at the plant of Valley Sausage Company during all
business hours (Tr. 29, 30, 212, 213). The pork trimmings
which were used by Valley Sausage Company in the manufacturing of its products were purchased from a Federal
inspected plant in the midwest and appeared wholesome and
fresh (Tr. 201, 202 & 203).
There is no practical method of inspecting hogs for the
presence of the trichina organism (Tr. 12, 13, 214, 215) and
no law or regulation requires that unfinished pork products
be inspected for the presence of the organism in any slaughter
house or n1eat processing plant (Tr. 12. 13 & 14); nor is there
any law or regulation requiring that pork products sold by the
6
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manufacturer or wholesaler in a raw condition, not ready for
human consumption without further processing, smoking or
cooking, be subjected to freezing or heating (Tr. 13, 14 & 21).
The samples of mettwurst taken by the inspectors from
the Jordan Meat were negative insofar as the trichina organism was concerned (Tr. 220). All mettwurst which was
sold as a finished product by Jordan Meat had been heated
to at least the required temperature of 13 7° Fahrenheit in
the Valley Sausage Company plant for the purpose of eliminating trichina (Tr. 37 & 38).
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court submitted the case to the jury by way of a special verdict (R. 46,
47 & 48), and thereafter a judgment was entered in favor
of both plaintiffs and against defendant Suhrmann, and in
favor of the defendants Noorda and Guss d/b/a Jordan
Meat, and against the two plaintiffs, no cause of action ( R.
107, 108 & 109). The trial court also granted the Motion of
defendants Noorda and Guss to dismiss the Cross-Complaint
of defendant Suhrmann (R. 116 and 117). Motions for a new
trial filed by plaintiffs and defendant Suhrmann were denied
by the trial court and these appeals were taken (R. 119 in
Schneider case and R. 22 in Bodon case) .

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING
A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS NOORDA
7
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AND GUSS AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE
REASON THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO FIND DEFENDANTS NOORDA AND GUSS GUlLTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFFS
TO CONTRACT TRICHINOSIS.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE
ISSUE OF INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING
A JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS NOORDA
AND GUSS AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS FOR THE
REASON THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO FIND DEFENDANTS NOORDA AND GUSS GUlLTY OF ANY NEGLIGENCE WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFFS
TO CONTRACT TRICHINOSIS.
In the brief filed by the plaintiffs, they persist in making
the statement that the processing of the raw mettwurst was to
be done by defendant Suhrmann under the supervision of
Jordan Meat. We readily admit that Suhrmann so testified
but it must be remembered that he has no defense to these
8
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actions and consequently has used every means at his disposal
to try and shift the burden of liability to defendants N oorda
and Guss. Suhrmann' s contentions in this respect were persistently denied by Noorda (Tr. 33, 254, 255, 256), and the
employee of Valley Sausage Company, Alfred Hoffman (Tr.
282, 283). In addition to this, the jury by their findings in
questions No. 3 and No. 4 of the Special Verdict answered
to the effect that if Hoffman did assist defendant Suhrmann
1n the processing of the mettwurst sausage that he was not
then an agent of Noorda or Guss (R. 47). We respectfully
submit that such a finding by the jury is conclusive and binding
on the parties, and thus must be taken as a fact that neither
Noorda, Guss nor the Jordan Meat had anything to do with
the further processing of the mettwurst.
Plaintiffs also contend that because the jury found in
answer to question No. 5 (b) that a reasonably prudent person
in the position of Noorda and Guss would have known that
Suhrmann intended to sell the mettwurst without processing
it to kill trichina, the trial court erred in entering a judgment
in favor of the said defendants, Noorda and Guss, and against
the plaintiffs. We respectfully submit that a close scrutiny
of the evidence fails to disclose any fact from which the jury
could reasonably have reached such a conclusion. Suhrmann
repeatedly testified that he talked only with Hoffman when
dealing with Jordan Meat (Tr. 62, 87, 96, 113 & 119), and
in view of the jury's finding in response to question No. 4,
mentioned above, any knowledge acquired by Hoffman relative
to the skill, knowledge or intentions of the defendant Suhrmann
regarding the further processtng of the mettwurst certainly
9
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could not be considered as imputed to defendants Noorda and
Guss. Mrs. Suhrmann testified that she dealt only with Hoffman
in making purchases of mettwurst from Jordan Meat (Tr.
143). Her dealings with Noorda were only in connection with
returns and receiving credits for shrinkage (Tr. 145, 146 &
147). Noorda testified as to his conversation with Suhrmann
relative to selling him raw and unprocessed mettwurst but he
was dealing with a man in the meat business and there is
nothing in the transcript of this conversation that would give
N oorda cause to doubt Suhrmann' s ability or intention to
further process the mettwurst in accordance with the standards
prescribed for the elimination of trichina ( T r. 244, 245 & 246).
Suhrmann said he had a smoke oven at his place of business
(Tr. 248). There was no duty placed upon Noorda to determine if defendant Suhrmann was competent to conduct his
own meat business and as the raw mettwurst had no appearance
of being ready to eat, or in an edible state when sold to
Suhrmann, there accordingly was no basis for a finding of
negligence on the part of either of the defendants Noorda or
Guss. This was the conclusion reached by the trial court and
one of the reasons for the lower court entering judgment upon
motion in favor of these defendants and against the plaintiffs.
This Honorable Court has often considered the question
of review of a jury's determination on appeal, and in Seybold
vs. Union Pacific Ry. Conzpany, 121 Utah 61, 239 P. 2d 174,
speaking through Mr. Justice Crockett, said:

nwe

have 110 disagreement \Vith the time-honored
rule that if there is substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the trier of the fact it will not be disturbed on review. But that means n1ore than a mere
10
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scintilla of evidence. See Wigmore 3rd Ed. Sec. 2494
... If there is any substantial competent evidence upon
which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make
the finding it should stand. But if the finding is so
plainly unreasonable as to convince the court that no
jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the :finding, it cannot be said to be supported by substantial
evidence. See also 20 Am. Jur. 1033."
Defendants Noorda and Guss respectfully submit that
aside from the evidence of such knowledge as Hoffman may
have had there is no ((substantial competent evidence" to
support the answer of the jury to question No. 5 (b) of the
Special Verdict as required by the law and as expressed by
this Court's decisions.
We now proceed to a consideration of the rules of law
applicable to the sale of pork and pork products. Plaintiffs
and appellants cite a number of cases contending for the proposition that where negligence is established there need be no
privity of contract as a basis for recovery by injured persons.
These defendants have no quarrel with this general principle
of law. However, this legal concept is only applicable to
finished products which are made or manufactured and sold
at that time in a condition for use or consumption by the
ultimate consumer, without further processing. Plaintiffs have
never contended that the mettwurst delivered to Suhrmann in a
raw or uncooked state was then ready for consumption. It was
obvious from the appearance of the unprocessed mettwurst introduced at the trial for illustrative purposes that it resembled
raw sausage, certainly not ready for eating. Suhrmann undertook to further process the product to make it :fit and ready for
11
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eating by his customers. Had this been done properly and in
accordance with known practices and acceptable standards of
the packing industry, the resultant product would have been
completely safe and edible (Tr. 13, 37, 245, 292 & 293).
Trichina is a minute parasite or round worm, microscopic
in size and invisible to the naked eye (Tr. 5 & 7). It is impossible and accordingly impractical for the packing industry
throughout the United States to inspect slaughtered hogs for
the presence of trichina (Tr. 12 & 14). Consequently, the
meat inspection laws merely require that all pieces of pork
or pork products which have a cooked or smoked appearance
when placed on the market, must have been treated by heating
up to 13 7° Fahrenheit or frozen in accordance with prescribed
methods in order to eliminate the trichina parasite (Tr. 12
& 13). It is thus the conclusion of the meat inspection
authorities in the United States that at the present time there
is no safe and practical method to insure that raw pork products
are free from trichina and health authorities have concluded
it best to carry on a public education program during the past
thirty years to caution the public to cook all raw pork products
(Tr. 13 & 14). Hence when Suhrmann purchased the raw
mettwurst from Jordan Meat the product did not have any
appearance other than being uncooked and unsmoked and
there was accordingly no duty upon Jordan Meat to have done
anything to eliminate trichina. The duty was upon Suhrmann
and he alone to finish the product by smoking at least to a
temperature of 13 7 degrees. This prescribed temperature is
extren1ely moderate and \vould have been easily attainable in
any stnoke oven which Suhrmann testified he used in further
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processing the product. Even though Suhrmann failed in his
duty to the plaintiffs in that respect, his undertaking to finish
the product was conclusive in breaking the chain of causation
in any negligence which plaintiffs are attempting to impose
upon the defendants Noorda and Guss. Based upon the foregoing analysis, these defendants respectfully submit that the
cases cited by plaintiffs at page 8 in their brief all deal with
finished products and are not even remotely in point to our
instant factual situation.
We believe that since the mettwurst was admittedly to be
further processed when it was sold by Jordan Meat, the cases
involving the sale of uncooked pork products set forth the
rule of law applicable here. In the case of Cheli vs. Cudahy
Bros. Company} 267 Mich. 690, 255 N W414, the court held
that even though the packer makes no inspection for trichina,
he is not guilty of negligence and is not liable to the ultimate
consumer. On the matter of the implied warranty under the
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, the court there said that
the warranty is that the food sold is fit for human consumption
in the ordinary manner, that is cooked. Also, in the case of
Dressler vs. MerkelJ Inc.J 284 NY Supp 697, 4 NE 2d 744,
the plaintiff, who became ill from eating trichinous mettwurst,
failed to recover for negligence against the packer who supplied the pork to the sausage making retailer, the packer
being held blameless in not foreseeing that the retailer might
use the pork improperly in processing the mettwurst to be
eaten by the plaintiff consumer without further cooking. This
is a case we believe to be precisely in point with our instant
set of facts. In other words, the wholesaler is entitled to
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assume that the product which he sells will be put to a normal
and reasonable use expected of such a product and he is not
liable where it would ordinarily be safe but the injury results
because it is mishandled by someone else. See Prosser on
Torts, page 499, citing Cheli vs. Cudahy Bros. Company, supra;
Vaccarino vs. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 Atl. 2d 316; Silverman
vs. Swift Co., 141 Conn. 450, 107 Atl. 2d 277; Eisenbach vs.
Gimbel Bros., 281 NY 474, 24 NE 2d 131.
Plaintiffs also cite a number of cases tn their brief in
support of the contention that the sale of trichina infected
mettwurst by the defendants Noorda and Guss violated Title
4-20-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, dealing with adulterated
food, and Title 4-20-8, dealing with food products of a diseased animal. It should be considered that all cases cited by
plaintiffs with respect to such are from the State of Ohio,
where the courts have adopted a rule of absolute liability, and
is the minority view in the United States. Those decisions
hold the seller liable upon mere proof that the meat was impure
or infected regardless of whether the seller knew, should have
known, or had any way of determining that the meat sold was
impure or infected. See Kurth vs. Kt'umme, 143 Ohio St. 638,
56 N.E. 2d 127; Troietto vs. G. H. Hammond Co., 110 F. 2d
13 5, and other cases cited in plaintiff's brief at pages 11 and
12. We respectfully submit that this minority rule places an
undue burden on manufacturers and producers of food and
food products, is exceedingly harsh and unjust, and if followed
with respect to pork products, would create an impossible
situation in the meat packing industry. The attention of this
Court is respectfully invited to the case of Feinstein t'S. Daniel
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Reeves et al., (D.C. New York, 1936) 14 Fed. Supp. 167,
wherein the court held that since neither the State or Federal
Government had prohibited the sale of infected pork and had
made no provisions for any system of inspection to determine
whether it contained trichina, there was no basis for concluding that the pure food law intended to include hogs
infected with trichinae under the classification of tediseased
animals" or ''unfit for food." Further interpreting the pure
food law in the case of Dressler vs. Merkel, Inc., supra, the
court likewise held that trichina infected meat is not within
the meaning of the term ''diseased" and goes on to say that
as used in the pure food law the term tediseased" must be
lin1ited to instances where animals are known to be diseased,
or v1here the disease could be discovered by inspection, or by
methods commonly used in manufacture. See also Zorger vs.
Hillman's, 287 Ill. App. 357, 4 N.E. 2d 900.
It is thus respectfully submitted that the trial court rightfully rendered a judgment of no cause of action in favor of the
defendants N oorda and Guss and against the plaintiffs in the
actions tried in the lower court.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE
ISSUE OF INADEQUACY OF DAMAGES.
The assertions made by plaintiffs under Point II of their
brief to the effect that the lower court erred in denying their
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motion for a new trial on the grounds of inadequacy of damages
are without merit. While this proposition does not directly
concern defendants Noorda and Guss, since no judgment was
rendered against them, we feel compelled to answer plaintiffs'
contention in that respect.
Plaintiffs have sought to detail considerable evidence
relative to their pain, suffering and alleged disabilities.
Schneider claimed he was severely incapacitated but apparently
not too ill, as he went swimming at Saratoga on Utah Lake
in September, 1955, a month following his illness (Tr. 185
& 186). Except for the month of August and part of September,
1955, Schneider carried on his insurance business and importing
business (Tr. 180, 181 & 182). In ap. effort to prove loss of
income, his income tax returns were introduced in evidence
but showed a higher income for 1956 than the three preceding
years (Tr. 182 & 183). Treatment for Schneider consisted
largely of vitamin pills prescribed by a naturopath and masseur
treatments (Tr. 176, 177, 178 & 179). His claim that he suffered
loss of income from his importing business due to the illness
is unsupported by the evidence because he changed his avocation from that to the insurance business due to a fear of war
coming to Europe and thereby losing his source of products
(Tr. 153).
As to the clain1s of Bodon, the evidence adduced pertaining to his pain, suffering and disability, \vas even weaker.
He claimed an inability to 'vork as a book binder for about
one \veek (Tr. 191 & 192). Although he testified that he still
had weakness in his arms and legs, Bodon played soccer in
September, 195), and throughout 1955 and 1956 (Tr. 193,
16
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194, 196, 197 & 198), to say the least, indulging in a vigorous
game.
After listening to the foregoing evidence and observing
the apparent well-being of each of the plaintiffs, the jury apparently concluded, as any reasonable person would from a
reading of such evidence, that the damages suffered by each
of the plaintiffs were negligible. The verdict rendered obviously
reflects such a feeling on the part of the jury.
Plaintiffs fail to point out in their brief specifically in
what respect the verdict of the jury shows they were acting
under the influence of passion or prejudice. They apparently
take the position that because the award given was small, it is
thereby self evident that such must be the case. However, in
fact and in truth, the jury no doubt came to the conclusion
that neither Badon nor Schneider was in ill health at the time
of trial, and that any damage previous!y suffered was minimal
and of little or no consequence. As is said by the author in
15 Am. Jur., par. 231, at page 664, on Damages:
((Generally, a verdict will not be disturbed merely
on account of the smallness of the damages awarded
or because the reviewing court would have awarded
more."
We respectfully submit that the conclusion reached by
the jury in our instant cases is amply supported by the evidence
and there has been no basis shown by either of the plaintiffs
as a ground for disturbing the verdict or granting a new trial.
CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, we respectfully submit that the
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judgment rendered by the trial court is in all respects correct,
and should be affirmed, and that the plaintiffs are not entitled
to a new trial on any ground.
Respectfully submitted,
HURD, BAYLE & HURD
ROBERT GORDON and
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR

Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents, Albert Noorda and
Sam L. Guss
1105 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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